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BACK TO THE BEGINNING: AN ESSAY ON THE
COURT, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, AND TRUST
Luis Fuentes-Rohwert

The law of democracy is in a state of incoherence. The
experiment begun by Baker v. Carr showed great promise yet soon
gave way to disappointment. The promise was one of modest review
and respect for politicalchoices made elsewhere. A presumption was
still against judicial involvement: absent self-entrenchment or
distrust of political outcomes, the Court would stay its hand. But,
the reality has been far from that. The presumption has now clearly
shifted, and the Court intervenes in politically-chargedcontroversies
as a matter of course. This raises a question at the heart of the law of
democracy: can we trust the Court to carry out its important yet
delicate work in the field of politics? The evidence is not promising.
The Court throws its weight around the thicket at will, arbitrarily
and irrespective of doctrine, precedent, or history. To the argument
that the Court must intervene when the political process is
"undeservingof trust," the question is why we should trust the Court
in its stead.
My own sense ...

is that the current Court is deeply distrustful

of the political branches and ambitious for its own power. And so, it
will plunge even further into the political thicket, ever more
encroaching on the power of the political branches. Like Macbeth, it
will find it impossible to wade no more.'
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
B.A., 1990, J.D., 1997, Ph.D., Political Science, 2001, University of Michigan;
LL.M., 2002, Georgetown University Law Center. I am terribly grateful to John
Applegate, Guy Charles, Jim Chen, Ken Dau-Schmidt, Mike Gerhardt, Charlie
Geyh, Ajay Mehrotra, Christy Ochoa, David Williams, and Susan Williams for
reading earlier versions of this Essay and offering helpful comments. The
argument also benefitted from faculty workshops at Indiana UniversityBloomington School of Law, the University of Minnesota Law School, the
University of Illinois College of Law, and the Big Ten Untenured Conference.
1. Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for
Getting the Least DangerousBranch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV.
667, 698 (2002); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal:The Evolution of
the Newest Equal Protectionfrom Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1345, 1366 (2001) [hereinafter Karlan, Nothing Personal] ("Once again, as it did
in the Shaw cases, the Court intervened [in Bush v. Gore] to short circuit the
1045
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The Court will continue to play the role of the omniscient and
strive toward omnipotence. And the law reviews will continue to play
the game of evaluating the Court's work in light of the fictions of the
law, legal reasoning, and legal history rather than deal with the
realities of politics and statesmanship.2
In modern times, the U.S. Supreme Court is firmly entrenched
as "king of the hill";3 its role in our constitutional universe is both
robust and supreme. From affirmative action 4 and congressional
powers5 to antisodomy statutes,6 particular instances of the war on
terror' and presidential elections,8 the Court exercises its
constitutional prerogative assertively, without "compunction." 9 The
Court handles most questions of public policy both confidently and
assertively.
Scholarly accounts of judicial review are consistent with this
view of the Court as a muscular institution. These include Larry
Kramer's portrayal of the Court's modern posture as "judicial
sovereignty"; 10 Aviam Soifer's critique of the Court's anarchic
posture;" Robert Post and Reva Siegel's analysis of the Court's
modern Section 5 jurisprudence; 2 and L.A. Powe's reflections about
normal, albeit potentially contentious and messy, process of self-government.
The Court's decision left in its wake weakened institutions.").
2. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: "Equalin Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REV. 143,
175 (1964).
3. Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4, 129
(2001).
4. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
5. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). This area
of the law is controlled, as are many others, by Justice O'Connor's vote.
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
9. Charles Lane, Civil Liberties Were Term's Big Winner: Supreme Court's
Moderate Rulings a Surprise, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at Al, A18 ("They go
out and decide these great national questions and don't feel compunction about
it.... It's the same mindset that lets them do Bush v. Gore. They see it as
their duty." (quoting Professor John C. Yoo)).
10. Kramer, supra note 3, at 130.
11. Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002)
("Neither the usual constraints of judicial craftsmanship nor the messy
processes of democracy act as significant barriers before the march of an
increasingly Imperial Court.").
12. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
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the politics of the Rehnquist Court. 3 They also include Mark
Tushnet's call to "Take the Constitution Away from the Court," a
project that14 self-consciously reacts to a strong view of judicial
supremacy, as well as the many efforts to defend or criticize the
practice. With few exceptions,1 6 the leading understanding of the
modern Supreme Court portrays the Court as the supreme,
exclusive interpreter of the Constitution.
This description of the Court is particularly fitting for the law of
democracy, often recognized as the quintessential site for judicial
supervision of the pathologies of American politics.'7
The
redistricting cases offer an apt example; this is an area of the law
that the Court had refused to regulate for many years, yet now
firmly controls." Whether under equal protection, 9 statutory vote

Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441
(2000).
13. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on
the Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 731
(2003) ("The Rehnquist majority has a strong aversion to disorder in the
political realm and included within that concept is the (abhorrent) idea that
others could appropriately and successfully interpret the Constitution.").
14. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
15. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial
Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 890 (2003) ("Much of the recent attack on
judicial review is really an effort to undermine judicial supremacy."). For
leading examples of the debate, see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher,
Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998); Gary
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Living with
Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579 (2003); Frederick Schauer,
Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution,92 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
17. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 28, 54 (2004) [hereinafter Pildes,
Constitutionalization]("[Clourts have a distinct calling, recognized already on
occasion, to address the structural problem of self-entrenching laws that govern
the political domain.").
18. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES,
WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL

OF 2000 (2d ed. 2001); Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing
Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION 155 (Ronald Dworkin ed.,
2002).
19. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964).
ELECTION
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redistricters must pay close

attention to what the Court says and does, no matter how confusing
or contradictory these principles may be.22 Such is the state of our
constitutional system and the Court's view of its own power.
The leading account is easy to sketch. Judicial intervention is
warranted when the political process is "undeserving of trust."23 In
its now classic formulation, such moments arise when "the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will
stay in and the outs will stay out."24 Hence John Ely's title for his

tour de force, Democracy and Distrust. This theory of judicial
review has much to commend it, especially as applied to the
particular problems that plague the law of democracy.
It is
inevitable that a democracy will have systemic wrinkles and flaws,
and judicial review should only be directed at ironing these wrinkles
out.26 The Court must choose its battles carefully, with an eye
towards improving the political process, rather than thwarting it.
This argument ultimately assumes too much and invites a
reconsideration of our accepted assumptions. Recall that the theory
informs only those moments "when the process is undeserving of
trust. 27 Only then should the courts play their "heroic" role.28 Yet

20. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
21. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Beer v. United States, 425

U.S. 130 (1976).
22. For criticisms of the Court's forays in this area, see Samuel Issacharoff,

The ConstitutionalContours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45 (1995);
Pamela S. Karlan, The FireNext Time: ReapportionmentAfter the 2000 Census,
50 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, PrincipledLimitations on Racial
and PartisanRedistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997).
23. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 103 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DISTRUST]
24. Id.; see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
PartisanLockups of the DemocraticProcess, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
25. ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 24.
26. For a further elucidation and defense of this position, see Michael J.
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747 (1991). For the critics, see, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling

Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
27. ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 23, at 103.
28. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (referring to the traditional yet erroneous
view of the Court as protector of defenseless minorities as the "heroic
countermajoritarian function"). For normative accounts of the traditional view
of the Court as protector of powerless minorities, see Milner S. Ball, Judicial
Protectionof Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1059 (1974) (offering
"some of the theoretical footings for a conception of the judiciary as a protector
of minorities in a government oriented to majority decision"); Robert M. Cover,
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this argument takes for granted the one premise it must defend:
assuming that the political branches cannot be trusted, can the
courts be trusted in their stead? To be fair, some accounts often
turn to the courts only as a last resort.29 As Rick Pildes explains
however, "absent other institutions to play this role in the United
States, courts will continue to be called upon to be the primary
external agency for overseeing democratic politics."

30

The courts are

clearly in charge of our politics, and so long as they remain there, we
must examine whether they can be trusted with this important and
delicate role.
This Essay concludes that our trust in the Court is
unwarranted. The experiment begun by Baker v. Carr had great
promise and the best of intentions. 3 The Court in Baker offered a
limited reading of its role in the political realm, a reading cognizant
of the many difficulties inherent to the field of politics and couched
in much-needed humility. The Court recognized that its role in the
political thicket must be cautious and deferential. Yet all too soon,
the Court ignored both the reasons that led it to enter this political
minefield and the complexities that made the law of democracy
particularly difficult to adjudicate. Worse yet, it is now clear that
Justice Frankfurter's worst fears have come to pass, as the Court
throws its weight in the political thicket at will, arbitrarily and
irrespective of doctrine, precedent, or history. The Court now passes
for yet another actor in the political process. This should be a cause
for concern on multiple grounds, especially for persons of color. The
Supreme Court's performance across time has not been receptive to
the interests of colored communities.32
In light of these criticisms, the one question left for scholars of
the law of democracy is a question of judicial posture: how
aggressively should the federal judiciary regulate the apparent
pathologies of our democracy? This is no longer a question scholars
bother to ask; in the wake of Baker and the Supreme Court's

The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J.
1287 (1982) (tracing the judicial protection of minorities to Justice Stone's
famous footnote four and offering a concomitant defense for such judicial
behavior in a society committed to democratic values).
29. See Pildes, Constitutionalization,supra note 17, at 44.
30. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV.
1605, 1611 (1999) [hereinafter Pildes, Theory].
31. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the
RedistrictingRevolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1353 (2002).
32. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME
COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993); Randall Kennedy,

Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor
Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622 (1986).
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triumphant entry into the political thicket, the question today is not
whether the courts should intervene vel non, but rather, how
aggressively must the courts intervene in the name of individual
rights,33 competitive elections,34 antidomination, 3 or myriad other
values.36 Everybody has a theory and a role for the Court to play in
our politics, and anyone who argues otherwise must overcome a
37
heavy burden of persuasion.
This Essay defends its own theory of judicial intervention. This
is an old theory, which looks back to the Court's point-of-entry into
the realm of political questions in Baker v. Carr. Part I discusses
the special nature of political questions and the reasons why the law
of democracy presents the Court with unique challenges. These
challenges counsel for a deferential judicial posture. This Part
underscores how the Court understood and applied these lessons in
Baker v. Carr, only to discard them in a moment's notice. This
decision proved to be a crucial moment in the Court's handling of
political questions. The Baker Court recognized the difficulties that
inhere in this important area and offered a modest approach to the
problem.
Yet Reynolds v. Sims," decided two years later after Baker
discussed in Part II, marked a radical shift in the Court's posture.
Once the Court betrayed the promise of Baker and exalted the
equipopulation principle as the standard of choice, it soon took on
the role of philosopher king, willing to regulate the law of democracy
in accordance with its own views about the needs of the political
process and its own diagnoses about the constitutional values at
stake.
Part III takes this argument to its logical resting place: the fall
In order to appreciate this
of the political-question doctrine.
argument, refer back to the days when the political-question
doctrine played an important role in our constitutional universe.

33. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (2003); Bruce E. Cain,

Garrett'sTemptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589 (1999).
34. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 24.
35. See Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial
Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411 (2008).
36. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic
Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1103 (2002); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL
L.REV. 601 (2007).

37. See Pildes, Constitutionalization,supra note 17, at 42 ("Whatever the
merits of taking the Constitution away from the courts in other areas,
constitutional law will continue to be necessary in this arena.").
38. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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This was a time when the Court would choose to avoid controversies
that might compromise its legitimacy. 39 The moniker "political
question" was thus a conclusion attached to any issue the Court
wished to avoid.40 The Court no longer worries about such matters
and takes on any and all cases irrespective of any perceived political
fallout. Bush v. Gore41 is the obvious exemplar of this modern
posture. The Court is clearly in charge of our politics, unabashed
and unafraid.
This is an awesome responsibility. Yet, as Part IV contends, the
Court has fallen far short of this promise. The setting for my
discussion is the gerrymandering doctrine. These cases offer a sober
example of a Court that picks its way through the thicket at will and
is only as aggressive and supreme as it wishes to be. This should be
disconcerting to us all as a normative matter, especially in light of
the concerns inherent to the field of democracy. We must give
More troubling for constitutional
Justice Frankfurter his due.
theory-and process theory in particular-is how the enterprise fails
precisely where it is needed the most. The Court has it exactly
backwards: it is aggressive in the racial gerrymandering cases,
where the process worked as expected,4 2 yet humble in the political
gerrymandering cases, where many accounts depict a broken
political market.43 This is nothing short of a "rootless muddle."4
Part V concludes that the Court must return to the promise of
Baker v. Carr. Rather than press for our preferred theories of
choice, American democracy would be much better served by a Court
that is respectful of policy agreements decided elsewhere. Rather
than trust the Court, in other words, we would be much better off
trusting democracy.
I.

A PROLEGOMENON: THE COURT COMES TO THE THICKET

It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the
politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial

39. See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of
Democracy: Of Political Questions, Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1899 (2006) [hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering].
40. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (complaining that "[tihe
present case . . . is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a
different label") (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
42. See Karlan, Nothing Personal, supra note 1; Michael J. Klarman,
MajoritarianJudicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491,
527-28 (1997).
43. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 24.
44. Burt Neuborne, Response to Professor Gardner: Is There a Theory in
this Class?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1519, 1520 (2003).
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intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the
abstractphrases of the law.45

This story begins with the towering figure of Justice
Frankfurter and his reasons for refusing to enlist the Court in the
hard work of regulating democratic institutions. The setting is the
redistricting landscape in the middle of the twentieth century, a
patchwork grounded in gross population inequalities and the
explicit refusal by state actors to redraw their districting plans. The
question for the federal courts was disarmingly simple: whether to
play a role in resolving this problem at all. The First Section
presents Justice Frankfurter's arguments against judicial
intervention in this area. The Second Section looks to the Court's
point-of-entry in Baker v. Carr and examines how the Court
ultimately addressed the concerns central to the law of democracy.
At the heart of this Section stands the question of why it should be
left for the court to do anything in this volatile and complex area.
A.

On the Special Nature of PoliticalQuestions

"Some claims of unconstitutionality, however much they may be
wrapped in the form of a conventional litigation," wrote Justice
Frankfurter in 1934, "the Court will never adjudicate."46 These were
the notorious political questions, outcasts in a legal universe where
courts decide all matters, great and small, brought to their
attention. Judges would decide these questions at their own peril,
Justice Frankfurter explained, for they are "not suited for
settlement by the training and technique and the body of judicial
experience which guide a court.4 7 These questions were unwieldy,
imprecise, and best left alone, to be handled and resolved by the
political process. As for how to define the boundaries of such
questions, Justice Frankfurter left open a small window, as "the
wisdom of the Court defines its boundaries."'
It is now commonplace to document the demise of the
Frankfurterian view of political questions as a central component of
our constitutional law orthodoxy. 49 But change did not come easy.
45. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946).
46. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court of the United States, 14
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 424 (1934), reprinted in LAW AND
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIx FRANKFURTER 1913-1938, at 26
(Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Pritchard, Jr. eds., 1962).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial
Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of
Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 501-02 (2002) ("By 1986,
however, such alarms had generally been consigned to the dustbin of history: to
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Justice Frankfurter had a very compelling set of arguments and did
not go down without a fight. And so while his understanding of
political questions was squarely repudiated in Baker v. Carr, his
shadow looms large over the law of democracy.50 Three features of
the law of democracy counsel for a judicial posture couched in
humility and restraint.
1. Stalking Horses and the Question of Power
The first feature dates at least as far back as Justice
Frankfurter's forceful admonition in Colegrove v. Green:51 the Court
must be particularly careful in this arena, lest it be confused with
another actor in the process. To his mind, complainants are
essentially asking the Court to intervene in party contests while
dressing up their prior defeat in the political process "in the abstract
phrases of the law."52 Put another way, the law of democracy must,
of necessity, take sides in politically charged controversies, and
invoking judicial doctrines and constitutional clauses does nothing
to alter that fact. Robert Dixon made a similar point soon after the
Court's explicit entry into the realm of politics in Baker v. Carr,
when he complained that the case was "an invitation to courts to sit
in judgment on the structure of 5political
power; even to effect a
3
judicial transfer of political power.
This point has not been lost on indefatigable plaintiffs wishing
to challenge the electoral outcome of their choice. To lose in the
political process is to return to fight another day in the courts, under
a dizzying array of available doctrinal tools, from Article I and the
First or Fourteenth Amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
campaign finance law, and/or state law principles.54
These challenges are known as "stalking horse" cases, and the
take only the most relevant comparison, the combination of Baker v. Carrand
Reynolds v. Sims was conventionally counted among the Court's greatest
successes, strengthening rather than weakening its institutional position.").
50. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court,
Election Law, and the DoctrinalInterregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 529 (2004)
("One might be tempted to call this Frankfurter's revenge. When one considers
the lengths to which Stevens must go to make the case for adjudicating partisan
gerrymander cases within an individual-rights framework, Frankfurter's
opinion in Colegrove and his dissent in Baker look quite prescient.").
51. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
52. Id. at 554.
53. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38
NOTRE DAME LAw. 367, 368 (1963). After all, "politics involves, at its core,
material questions concerning the organization of power." Pildes, supra note
17, at 40.
54. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?:
JudicialReview of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004).

HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1053 2008

1054

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

litigants are often defeated candidates or political parties
themselves looking for any chance to upset settled political
outcomes. 55 In turn, much of the effort within the law of democracy
is focused not on the vindication of individual rights by aggrieved
litigants, but on the use of the courts as a means to secure a second
chance to win public office. Bush v. Gore was one such case, yet it
hardly stands alone.56 The incentives created by the law of elections
guarantee as much.
2.

The Political Question in Context: Power Meets Fear

The second feature also finds expression in the reapportionment
debates. These were arguments for which the political question
doctrine did much of the heavy lifting. The classical strand of the
doctrine made a fleeting appearance in the early cases, as the Court
intimated that this was an exclusive area for Congress to regulate. 7
But the Court soon discarded this argument. More important was
the prudential strand and the notion that the Court must traverse
this terrain carefully. The question was not whether the Court had
the power to handle these questions, for the Court clearly did.58

55. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights
in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 297 n.60 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan,
The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705,

1733-35 (1993) (describing the strategic use by interested partisans of the
equipopulation rule and the Voting Rights Act); Pildes, Theory, supra note 30,
at 1608 (discussing the Karcher opinion and complaining that "[t]he 'right'
claimed here, as often in political cases, was obviously a stalking horse for other
interests").
56. Edward Blum, plaintiff in Bush v. Vera, 515 U.S. 1172 (1995), was an
unsuccessful Republican candidate for Congress in one of the challenged
districts. MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 1994, at 1252 (1993). George L. DeLoach, plaintiff in Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), was another unsuccessful candidate, but in the
Eleventh District Democratic primary. Id. at 358.
57. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). For a contrary view,
see

ALEXANDER

M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:

THE

SUPREME COURT

190-91 (2d ed. 1986) (disagreeing that Colegrove stands
for the view that the Constitution leaves to Congress exclusive authority to
monitor congressional elections, as both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment may be said to so authorize the Court to play a role in this area).
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS

See also Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative
Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711, 713 (1963)

("That such a claim is within the subject matter committed to the Court seems
beyond dispute.").
58. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Both opinions joining the result in Colegrove v[.1 Green agreed that
considerations were controlling which dictated denial of jurisdiction though not
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Rather, the question was whether the Court "ought . . .enter this
political thicket."59 This was the nub of the argument, as Congress

may ultimately reject the Court's work. 60 Entering the thicket thus
involved grave risks, not the least of which was the erosion of the
Court's considerable yet fragile legitimacy and public standing.
This feature of the law of democracy formed the long-standing
basis for the political question doctrine. This concern dates back to
Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of political questions in Marbury
v. Madison6 and Chief Justice Taney's admonition in Luther v.
Borden about the Court's duty "to examine very carefully its own
powers before it undertakes to exercise jurisdiction."62 This is a
healthy concern, for it recognizes that the Court does not operate
within a cultural and political vacuum. There are times in our
constitutional world when prudence must carry the day."
3.

Taking Sides: On the Art of Discretion

The third feature harkens back to Justice Frankfurter's reasons
for refusing to enlist the Court in the hard work of regulating
democratic institutions.
Justice Frankfurter's complaint boiled
down to the fact that these were political conflicts of the highest
order, a "clash of political forces in political settlements." 64 And he

was undoubtedly right about that. The question under review in
Baker was a classic question of politics, a matter that entailed
"accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie
these mathematical puzzles."6" Among these, Frankfurter included
the following:
Considerations
of geography,
demography,
electoral
convenience, economic and social cohesions of divergencies
among particular local groups, communications, the practical
effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city
machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect
in the strict sense of want of power.").
59. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. But see Charles L. Black, Inequities in
Districtingfor Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13,
14 (1963) ("[Colegrove] can satisfy only if one starts with the postulate that
judicial wisdom . . . always consists in judicial self-restraint, and that the
reasons proferred for such restraint are .. .always to pass for well-founded, if
stated in the set terms of art.").
60. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552-53.
61. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 25 (3d ed. 2000).
62. 48 U.S. 1, 39 (1849).
63. See BICKEL, supra note 57, at 184.
64. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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for proven incumbents of long experience and senior status,
mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant data,
and a host of others.66
Redistricting plans reflect innumerable values, none of which is
inherently deserving of constitutional protection. Should legislators
represent people or interests, groups or regions?
To ask this
question is to beg another: which institution must be entrusted with
this crucial public function?
The traditional answer, of course, is the state legislatures, a fact
the Court never tires to remind us. 6 But this is not to say that the
Court should play no role at all. According to Alexander Bickel,
Colegrove certainly did not say that nor did the Court say that this
68
is an area reserved by the Constitution to Congress.
Rather,
Colegrove is a political question case, so the issue is whether this is
"a matter of the sort for which we have no rules, and as to which we
'believe that the job is better done without rules.' 69 Discretion is
crucial here, for the goal is that of crafting representative
institutions, with everything that such a difficult task entails. 0
How should a legislature do so? After all,
[i]t remains in large part, perhaps unfortunately, a task of
pragmatic trial and error to construct representative
deliberative institutions that are responsive to the views, the
interests, and the aspirations of heterogeneous total
constituencies, and that are yet not so fragmented or finely
balanced as to be incapable of decisive action.71
This is not an easy task. The question was thus a question of
66. Id. at 323-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
67. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 414
(2006); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (contending that
Article I of the U.S. Constitution "leaves with the States primary responsibility
for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts"); Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) ("We say once again what has been said on many
occasions: reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State
through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court."); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) ("[The District Court] correctly recognized
that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative
consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate
only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional
requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do
so.").
68. BICKEL, supra note 57, at 190-91.
69. Id. at 191.
70. See, e.g., HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
(1966).
71. BICKEL, supra note 57, at 192.
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process: once a legislature makes the requisite determinations,
whatever these may be, how should a court respond? It must
respond by recognizing that the judiciary must play a secondary
role, a prudential role, a lessened role. The Court in Colegrove was
only recognizing that fact.
This point brings Justice Frankfurter's criticism into sharper
focus. As a descriptive matter, courts could not accommodate the
"incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these
mathematical puzzles," and assigning them the task is sheer folly
and would "attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to
judges. 72 To enter this terrain is to decide questions of policy and
ultimately take sides in political battles of the highest order. In
turn, it is to offer those who lose in the political process a second
chance to see their preferred policy preferences enacted into law.
As a normative matter, the question is: why place the courts in
This question lies at the heart of Justice
this role at all?
The real
Frankfurter's charge of "judicial omnicompetence."7
not only
becomes
question for judicial intervention in this area
whether the political process can be trusted to function properly, for
this is only half the question. The other half is why the courts
should be trusted in their stead.
B.

The Need for Judicial Intervention-Bakerv. Carr

The Baker majority was not deterred by these complexities, due
in great measure to the sui generis nature of the facts at issue.
Tennessee presented a case of political process failure, with extreme
population disparities borne of legislative inaction and no recourse
for popular majorities to effect change.74 The Tennessee legislature
had last redistricted in 1901, and so by 1960 the districting map
looked nothing short of a "crazy quilt."" The numbers did not make
any sense at all; they were not supported by any particular state
policy nor could they be explained on any legitimate state ground."
They offered a classic case of arbitrary and capricious state action.
Helpful facts were only half the story; the other half-the legal
obstacles facing the Court-seemed daunting, as the critics
forcefully pointed out. The critics first took issue with the Court's

72. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. This argument was made forcefully by Anthony Lewis five years before
Baker. See Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts,
71 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1057-58 (1957).
75. Baker, 369 U.S. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring).
76. See id. at 257 (Clark, J., concurring).
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use of precedent.77 After all, was Colegrove v. Green not authority
for the proposition that the federal courts must stay out of this
"thicket," as understood by the lower court?78 Did the political
question doctrine not bar review? 79 Further, why turn to the equal
protection clause for support when the claim would find a more
hospitable constitutional home under the guarantee clause? °
The Baker majority turned away these questions with a
simplicity that spoke volumes about the Court as an institution and
its need to enter this long neglected terrain. On the question of
Colegrove as precedent, the Court counted votes and concluded that
four of the seven voting Justices upheld a grant of jurisdiction over
the subject matter."'
Even Frankfurter's controlling opinion
appeared "questionable" on this issue.8' After a lengthy discussion,
the Court also dismissed the political-question argument. The
Court took the guarantee clause head on and concluded that the
inquiry here was "primarily a function of the separation of powers.
The question was thus whether the Constitution committed the
matter under review to another branch of government or whether
the actions exceed the grant of authority as exercised by the proper
branch. And that question belonged to the Court "as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution."84 Put in simple terms: this was a
case, ergo the Court may decide it."' On Baker's logic, one may even
77. See Kurland, supra note 2, at 149 ("It is impossible to believe that the
Court was as artless as it represented itself to be; it is difficult to believe that
the Court thought it could find an audience ingenuous enough to accept the
assertion [that Baker did not conflict with precedents].").
78. See Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). But see
Baker, 369 U.S. at 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that
Colegrove's refusal to hear the case on the merits was "not in the strict sense of
want of power"); Lucas, supra note 57, at 713 ("That such a claim is within the
subject matter committed to the Court seems beyond dispute."); Robert B.
McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal
Protection,61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 656-57 (1963).

79. For criticism of the Court's discussion of the political question doctrine,
see, for example, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Legislative Apportionment and the
FederalConstitution, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329 (1962).

80. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the
Constitutional Guaranteeof Republican Government, 50 CAL. L. REV. 245, 25759 (1962); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4:
A Study of Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 570-72 (1962);
Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: OriginalMistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 106-07 (2000).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
As Mark Tushnet explained, "in a world where the Court is comfortable
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conclude that the Court had an "unsought responsibility" to so act. "
To the critics, the Court's answer fell far short, for the opinion
offered neither a workable, manageable standard for examining
redistricting plans 87 nor, assuming an equal protection violation, did
the opinion explain what remedies a court was authorized to grant.8
To the Court, however, these questions were the stock-in-trade
of traditional judicial review. The lower courts would simply
determine whether the plans under review violated the equal
protection clause by turning to the "well developed and familiar"
equal protection standards. 9 As the Court explained, somewhat
hastily and opaquely, "it has been opened to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the
particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy,
but simply arbitrary and capricious action." 90 As for the question of
remedies, the Court offered the following: "we have no cause at this
stage to doubt the District Court will be able to fashion relief if
violations of constitutional rights are found."9'
The critics were far from impressed."
It is in this vein that Baker essentially overruled the political
question doctrine in principle, if not in name. To be sure, the Court
wrote a very doctrinal opinion while careful to sidestep-not
overrule-existing precedents. It is a very shallow opinion, as the
with interpreting the Constitution and uncomfortable with allowing anyone else
to do so, once it is conceded that a provision means something, the 'textually
demonstrable commitment' element simply falls away." Mark Tushnet, Law
and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1211

(2002).
86. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
87. See Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical

Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107, 108 (1962)
("Nowhere does the Court indicate, by dictum or otherwise, what standards
might be used in determining the validity of an apportionment scheme which
creates such inequalities."); Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 62-64 (1962).
88. See Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politicsin Search of Law, 1962 SuP. CT.

REV. 252, 262 ("The issue, of course, was not what remedy would be 'most
appropriate' but whether any remedy at all lay within the power of a federal
court of equity acting within its discretion, an issue which it could hardly have
been 'improper' to consider in advance of trial.").
89. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 198.

92. See Neal, supra note 88, at 262 ("For the Court to remove that issue
from the case, if that was its meaning, by asserting that it had 'no cause ...

to

doubt' was little less than an expression of contempt for the views of numerous
other responsible judges.").
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Court said precious little about the underlying theories of political
representation and offered instead a rationality test.93 Baker may
also be read as a narrow decision, as the Court limited itself to the
facts in front of it. 94 So long as its holding applied to other cases, it
was only "to the extent that one decision necessarily bears on other
cases." 95 Baker was a prototypical minimalist decision.
More importantly, Baker marks the moment in the Court's
history
when
fear
and
prudence
gave
way
to
the
constitutionalization of our politics. Once the Court took on the
reapportionment problem then plaguing the nation, and did so to
rousing success, there was nary a political issue, big or small, that
the Court could not handle. Put another way, "Baker v. Carr made
it natural to reject political question arguments by noting that only
an ordinary question of constitutional interpretation of the sort
courts routinely answer was at stake."96 Once fear was out, it
became natural for the Court to handle any issue it wished to
decide, irrespective of complexity or whether the political process
demanded-much less justified-judicial involvement. This was
true even for presidential elections.
Therefore, the first lesson of the reapportionment revolution
should be clear: questions of politics are no different from questions
of constitutional law writ large. 97
Seen this way, the distance
between Justice Frankfurter and the Baker majority was simply a
disagreement grounded in principle-not law-about how to handle
these questions. To Justice Frankfurter, these cases should not be
brought within the constitutional law orthodoxy.
In Baker, a
majority of the Court resoundingly thought otherwise.
II.

FIRST PRINCIPLES: TRUST AND THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on

93. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 31, at 1365-72; cf. Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20 (1996) ("In a
parallel process, judges may adopt a standard in the form of a 'reasonableness'
test instead of deciding on the appropriate rule.").
94. See Abner Mikva, What Justice Brennan Gave Us to Keep, 32 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 655, 656-57 (1999) ("[Allthough Justice Brennan had votes to burn for
his opinion, he still kept the language of Baker v. Carrnarrow.").
95. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 15.
96. Tushnet, supra note 85, at 1208.
97. See, on this point, Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3
ELECTION L.J. 371, 372 (2004) ("But I do not think that electoral law can be cut
free from constitutional law more generally, which requires the Court to
continue playing an active role in defining basic norms.").
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government would be necessary.98
The facts in Baker v. Carroffered the Court easy entry into the
realm of politics. The Court could not have scripted a better
scenario within which to make its triumphant entry: after decades of
neglect and outright refusal to reapportion the state, the resulting
districting lines bore no semblance of rationality, and there was
nothing that the electorate-no matter how "civically militant "99could do to remedy the problem. This was a classic case of political
self-entrenchment, a "constantly looming pathology of democratic
systems"'0 0 that courts have a "distinct calling" to address. 0' On
these facts, the Court could put its considerable prestige and
legitimacy to work in furthering democratic values, rather than
working against them.
This is an arresting argument. It is also incomplete and
ultimately unsatisfactory, for normative, descriptive, and doctrinal
reasons. To begin with the normative: the real question for judicial
intervention in this area is not only whether the political process
can be trusted to function properly, for this is only half the question.
The other half is why the courts should be trusted in its stead. This
is a question that scholars rarely bother to ask. According to Rick
Pildes, for example, "courts have a distinct calling, recognized
already on occasion, to address the structural problem of selfentrenching laws that govern the political domain. 1 2 Why the
courts? His argument on this point is worth quoting at length:
[Tihe vitality of democracy depends upon external institutions
that can contain this disease. These institutions need not be
courts; viable alternatives, such as independent electoral
commissions, exist in many democracies. But the American
system generally lacks these intermediate institutions, and
constitutional
law, almost by default, has come to fill this
3
role."

For an argument grounded on the strength of the Court as an
institution, this cannot be enough. What we need is an argument
for why the courts are the institution to play this crucial role. What
is needed, in other words, is an answer to Justice Frankfurter's
charge of "judicial omnicompetence.",o 4 He argued that to charge the
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
100. Pildes, Constitutionalization,supra note 17, at 44.
101. Id. at 54; see Issacharoff & Pildes, supranote 24.
102. Pildes, Constitutionalization,supra note 17, at 54.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Baker, 369 U.S. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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courts with this role is to empower them "to devise what should
constitute the proper composition of the legislatures of the fifty
States.' ' 5 It might even vest upon judges the mantra of philosopher
kings, 1°' for it allows them to decide these difficult questions of
policy in accordance with their views about political philosophy-in
fairness, much of what goes for scholarly commentary and models of
judicial review must be situated precisely within this criticism.
John Ely never gave us an answer to Justice Frankfurter's
important question,"7 and neither have his contemporaries.
The descriptive answer merges with the doctrinal in the postBaker litigation. An answer to Justice Frankfurter's caustic critique
must begin with a posture of judicial deference and recognition that
the Court does not hold answers to all questions, large or small.
This argument understands the Baker case as sui generis and the
Court as a cautious institution. This argument also takes seriously
the charge that the Court must intervene only when the process
malfunctions. But as the remainder of this Part explains, the Court
is now far removed from the promise of Baker v. Carr. Almost as
soon as the Court entered the political terrain, its cautious approach
gave way to a far more aggressive posture and the question of
"process malfunction" became a term of art.
The case was Reynolds v. Sims. l O" In Reynolds, the Court moved
ahead with its standard of choice for evaluating redistricting plans,
the now familiar equipopulation principle. As it explained, "[iull
and effective participation by all citizens in state government
requires ... that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature.""° 9 This meant, more
specifically, that "[p]opulation [was], of necessity, the starting point
for consideration and the controlling criterion""' for judging
districting plans.
This conclusion was neither surprising nor radical in light of the
egregious population disparities then in existence. The simplicity of
the standard is undeniable, particularly under its traditional
moniker of "one person, one vote.""' It bespeaks of common sense,
traditional democratic values, and majority rule, all qualities that

105. Id. at 269 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
106. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892-93 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
107. See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a
Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 403-05 (1984).
108. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
109. Id. at 565.
110. Id. at 567.
111. Id. at 562-63.
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112
help explain why the public embraced the Court's intervention.
After all, who could disagree with a constitutional rule that
demands that each vote count as much as another?
Unsurprisingly, members of Congress could disagree, and some
of them fought hard to reverse the Court's decision or blunt its
impact. 1 3 Part of this response was undoubtedly self-interested.
Yet it is worth remembering that the equality principle at the heart
of the Fourteenth Amendment offered the Court multiple doctrinal
paths and could find expression in innumerable judicial standards.
Put another way, the equipopulation standard was not demanded by
constitutional precedent, text, or history, as Justice Frankfurter
forcefully argued in his Baker dissent. The standard was certainly
simple to administer, but as John Ely explains, the harder task was
in explaining what else it had to recommend it."' This was not like
the issue in Brown v. Board of Education, where the equality
principle offered the Court a self-evident path to equality. 1 5 No
such path existed in Reynolds, and in a telling passage, the Court
recognized as much. The Court was "told," "advised," "admonished,"
and "cautioned" that reapportionment was a complex and even
dangerous area, and thus its handling of these questions must be
cautious and respectful of policy choices made elsewhere." 6 This
was the crux of the matter, and the Court appeared ready to tackle
it head on.
How was this for an answer?
"[A] denial of
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our

oath and our office require no less of us." 117 I cannot pretend to

know what this means. This was not an adequate response to
Justice Frankfurter's charge.
And so the Reynolds opinion must be understood for what it
was: a moment in the Court's history when the justices drew a line
in the sand and carved a doctrinal niche from among competing
rationales. The Court chose a line and committed to it, requiring
only courage and conviction. As for the second lesson of the
reapportionment revolution: we should not forget, particularly in
light of the Court's hesitations in Vieth v. Jubelirerand its professed
inability to locate a standard to govern political gerrymandering

112. Robert McCloskey attributed this overwhelming reaction to a "latent
consensus." See McCloskey, supranote 87, at 58-59.
113. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and
Congress: ConstitutionalStruggle for FairRepresentation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209,

231-38
114.
115.
116.
117.

(1964).
See ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 23, at 121.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954).
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566-67 (1964).
Id. at 566.

HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1063 2008

1064

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

controversies,11 8 that the Court in Reynolds pulled its standard of
choice essentially out of a hat."9
I take from Reynolds and its companion cases a cautionary note
about the Court and its power in contemporary politics. Unlike
Baker, these were not cases where the political process was
"undeserving of trust." Rather, these were cases where the Court
simply disagreed with the redistricting outcomes from most of the
state legislatures. In fact, there is no good way to defend Reynolds
other than as a case where the Court implemented its political
theory of choice. This is acceptable, so long as one agrees with the
Court's particular choices. But those who accept Reynolds as a
legitimate exercise of the Court's newfound power must be careful
what they wish for. Once the Court domesticated the political
question doctrine, its reach into the realm of politics was boundless.
This conclusion raises what I take to be the central question for
those who write about the law of democracy. Recall that Baker was
a minimalist decision, both narrow and shallow.
In contrast,
Reynolds was an example of a maximalist Court-the decision was
both deep and wide. Reynolds was a deep opinion because the Court
spent a great deal of time on first principles and theoretical
abstractions, in particular its discussion of "one person, one vote"
and the concept of political representation.' 0 The opinion was also
wide because the Court did not confine itself to the facts as then
existing in Alabama, but instead applied the case broadly, to many
and all cases into the future. The effects of Reynolds at the state
level bespeak the opinion's maximalist approach. In implementing
the equipopulation standard, the Court accepted no argument but
its own, and in so doing it rearranged state governments in the
process. As Justice Stewart asserted in the companion Lucas case,
"[t]he Court's draconian pronouncement.., makes unconstitutional
the legislatures of most of the 50 States."'2 ' Or in the words of a
118. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) ("As the following
discussion reveals, no judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we
must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that
Bandemer was wrongly decided.").
119. For a discussion on this point, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating
the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair Representation, and the
Necessary Question of Judicial Will, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 423, 435
(2005) [hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating]. Additionally, see Pildes,
Theory, supra note 30, at 1613 ("That the Court quickly embraced one-vote, oneperson . . . is a statement about the Court's subsequent choices, not about
anything inherent in the nature of doctrines that would have been sufficient to
strike down gross malapportionment.").
120. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.
121. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 746 (1964)
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recent account of the reapportionment revolution and its aftermath:
"every state legislature would have to redraw districts and rewrite
its apportionment laws in line with the new doctrine of one person,
one vote."122
How can this shift in the Court's posture towards redistricting
questions be explained? I offer some tentative answers to this
important question in the last Part. For the moment, I only note
that this question exerts a tremendous amount of critical pressure
on those who offer their own theories and roles the Court should
play in the field of democracy. I confess surprise on this score; the
Court's confused and erratic behavior towards questions of politics
within the last generation should be reason for advocating less
aggressive review, not more.
III. ON THE DEMISE OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OR, HOW THE SPIRIT
OF REYNOLDS TOOK OVER THE LAW OF ELECTIONS

Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined.121
Baker and Reynolds tell an important story about the Court and
its power in contemporary American politics. Taken together, they
make clear that the Court's power extends as far as the justices
demand that it does, cabined only by pragmatic considerations.
Recall in this vein Robert Dixon's prescient analysis; to his mind,
Baker was "an invitation to courts to sit in judgment on the
structure of political power; even to effect a judicial transfer of
political power."1

24

This is an important point in two ways.

Note

first that Baker was only an invitation to courts, not a requirement
that they intervene. This is clearly right, and the reason why Baker
must be understood as contra distinct from Reynolds and the
equipopulation revolution. Baker allows for intrusion into politics
yet clearly stops short of aggressive judicial intervention.'25 Yet the
Court pushed this invitation to its limits, leading Professor Dixon to
remark soon after the Court's decision in Reynolds and its
companion cases 126 that the "[c]ourts not only have entered the
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
122.

& JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN

STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE

INEQUALITY:

POLITICS 178 (2008).
123. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv.L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
124. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
125. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 31; see also BICKEL, supra note 57, at
196 ("The point decided was not what function the Court is to perform in
legislative apportionment, and certainly not whether it is to take over full
management, but whether it can play any role at all.").
126. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
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thicket, they occupy it." "' The second point underscores how
prescient Dixon's sentiment was and how close it came to describing
the controversy surrounding
the aftermath of the 2000 presidential
128
election in Bush v. Gore.
This Section does not retell this oft-told story, nor does it offer
any new insights about the Court's handling of what is easily the
most politically charged case in recent memory. 129 Instead, it makes
two modest claims. The first claim looks back to Baker and the
reasons that thrust the Court into the realm of politics. The
similarities between Baker and Bush v. Gore are striking, 130 and
Bush is nothing but a logical extension of Reynolds v. Sims. 3'
Justice Frankfurter must get his due, as his concerns have come to
pass and the Court has become another political actor, taking sides
in politically charged controversies. 3 2
A distinct difference, of course, lies in the normative reasons for
(1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Md.
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); see
also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote," in
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s 11 (Nelson W. Polsby ed. 1971).

127. Dixon, supra note 113, at 210; see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("These decisions, with Wesberry v. Sanders, involving congressional
districting by the States, and Gray v. Sanders, relating to elections for
statewide office, have the effect of placing basic aspects of state political
systems under the pervasive overlordship of the federal judiciary."); see also
Pildes, Theory, supra note 30, at 1606 ("In the relatively short time since
[Baker], the United States Supreme Court has not only entered the 'political
thicket,' but with remarkable speed has found conflicts of democratic politics
coming to dominate its docket.").
128. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
129. See David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427,
1427 (2006) ("Few cases in the Supreme Court's 200-plus year history have
more deeply tested its institutional legitimacy than Bush v. Gore.").
130. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a
Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 390 (2001) ("Bush is Baker v.
Carrin conservative garb.").
131. See Richard L. Hasen, A "Tincture of Justice": Judge Posner's Failed
Rehabilitation of Bush v. Gore, 80 TEX. L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (book review)
("Reynolds v. Sims, whether it is good or bad politics, begets Bush v. Gore.");
Tushnet, supra note 85, at 1208 ("If ordinary constitutional interpretation
produces a quite rigid one-person, one-vote rule, what if anything lies outside
the domain of ordinary constitutional interpretation?").
132. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946); see also Michael
C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U.
COLO. L. REV. 923, 932-33 (2001) ("The pointillism of their decision aimed to
avoid entanglement in future political thickets, even as they emerged badly
bloodied from the thorns of Bush v. Gore itself. Somewhere, Justice
Frankfurter is chuckling.").
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the Court to take the initial step of "deciding to decide."133 The
Court in Baker had impeccable reasons, grounded in what was a
clear failure of the political process. It is difficult to offer a similar
defense of the Court's intervention in Bush, though some
commentators have certainly tried.
If anything, the political
process appeared to be working too well. The lessons of the case are
both clear and uncontroversial: the Court is mired in our politics,
willing and ready to strike a blow for our constitutional democracy.
The Court cannot help itself.'
The second claim situates Bush within our political question
tradition and agrees that the case raised a political question. By
this I do not mean a political question in the crude sense of day-today politics, of the world inhabited by Republicans and Democrats;
of course Bush v. Gore is that. Rather, I mean it in the doctrinal
sense, which places the case in distinguished company, with Luther
v. Borden 36 and Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon.3 7 To be sure, many commentators have situated Bush v.
Gore within this tradition, 38 but the crucial insight of the political
question doctrine cannot be understated and often goes unnoticed.
It is not that particular questions are textually committed to the
political branches rather than the courts. This aspect of the political
133. The phrase is from H.W.

PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA

SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

134. See

RICHARD

(1991).

A.

POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Richard A. Epstein, "In Such

Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore
Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001); Nelson Lund, The Unbearable
Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 (2002).
135. See Toby Harnden, Justice Antonin Scalia: Al Gore to Blame for 2000
US Election Mess, TELEGRAPH, June 27, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/2200495/Justice-Antonin-Scalia-A-Gore-to
-blame-for-2000-US-election-mess.html ("But I don't know how we could have
avoided it. Could we have declined to accept the case on the basis that it wasn't
important enough?[']" (quoting Justice Scalia)).
136. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
137. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
138. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in BUSH v. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 129, 129-41 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 55, 71-73 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Jeffrey
Rosen, Political Questions and the Hazards of Pragmatism, in BUSH V. GORE,
supra, at 145-62; Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093, 1105-09 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Disappearing
Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for
PresidentialElectors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 578-85 (2001); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571,
592-607 (2002).
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question doctrine-known as its classical strand-has ceased to do
any work for quite some time. 3 9 Instead, the real bite of the
doctrine lies in its prudential strand: courts choose to intervene in or
abstain from deciding particular controversies for pragmatic
reasons, often out of a real concern that its edicts will go
underenforced. 4' Such was the case in Colegrove v. Green and
Luther v. Borden, and there is very little reason to think that this
should not have been the case in Bush v. Gore.
Let me be clear: in Bush v. Gore, the per curiam opinion
professed an inability to decline to hear the case. The language here
was of an "unsought responsibility," 4 ' which is clearly misleading.
The Court could have declined to hear this case, and in fact, if the
prudential political question doctrine retained any vitality
whatsoever, the Court would have been wise to let the political
process run its course. Yet the Court plunged ahead and essentially
stopped the Florida recount,"' confident that its edict would not go
unenforced. The real insight of Bush v. Gore lies precisely here:
public perceptions about judicial supremacy are so strong, and the
Court's legitimacy so secure, that the justices no longer need to hide
behind platitudes such as "political questions" and "judicially
manageable standards." The political question doctrine is dead, and
the Court is clearly in charge of our politics, ready to act and
unafraid of any negative repercussions.
In saying this, I do not mean to criticize the Court's handling of
the litigation in Bush. If anything, this case offered a much-needed
corrective to the classical view of the Court as detached from
politics. Candor about the Court and its work is important and
often lacking in popular accounts of the Court. What I take from
Bush is the Court's insistence to treat these politically charged
questions as run-of-the-mill constitutional questions.
Political
questions are no longer a special breed of case. Questions of judicial
power and standards no longer offer any practical resistance.
IV. You CAN TRUST THIS? A DISSENT

We increasingly see the images of democratic politics that
underlie the Court's decisions as simply ad hoc-different views of
139. See Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering,supra note 39, at 1912.
140. See id. at 1913-15.
141. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) ("When contending parties invoke
the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to
resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced
to confront.").
142. See Powe, Jr., supra note 13, at 730-31 ("[Tlhe claim in Bush v. Gore
that deciding the election was an 'unsought responsibility' rings hollow. The
Court could have avoided the responsibility by denying certiorari.").
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the point of politics emerge almost at random as the Court confronts
to restructurings
questions that range from patronage to redistricting
143
....
initiatives.
of the political process through voter
Bush v. Gore is not an isolated example of the Court's
aggressive handling of questions of politics. It is standard fare
across the law of democracy. This is true even in areas where
moderation would appear to present a better approach. Consider
first the wrongful districting cases, the source of much controversy
and disarray. 44 To begin, take a legislature during a redistricting
session. Assuming partisan control of all necessary posts, one would
expect legislative outcomes to reflect the partisan attitudes and
desires of their authors. Throw into the mix controlling federal law,
particularly pre-clearance and vote dilution requirements under the
Voting Rights Act, 14' and the legislative handiwork immediately
increases in complexity. In this scenario, the controlling party could
give up hope and relent to the federal pressures not of its own
making while stretching its partisan gains as much as possible, or it
could attempt to comply yet hold onto previous gains.
The North Carolina legislature found itself in this unenviable
position during the fall of 1991. Soon after submitting its newly
crafted redistricting plan in order to comply with its pre-clearance
requirement, the Department of Justice refused to pre-clear it, on
the view that one majority minority district would not be enough to
comply with Section 5.146

The legislature then called a special

session in January 1992 and drafted a plan that sought to comply
gains. 147
with DOJ's request while holding onto its previous political
This balancing act required great artistry, and to some North
Carolinians, the legislature could not legitimately pull it off.
This is a nutshell account of the political process leading up to

143. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 24, at 646.
144. See ISSACHAROFF ETAL., supra note 18, at 906-07.

145. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000). The vote dilution
requirement of the Act is codified in Section 2. Id. § 1973. It essentially
proscribes, under a totality of circumstances inquiry, whether "members of a
class of citizens protected by [the statute] .

..

have less opportunity than other

members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." Id. The non-retrogression requirement is
codified in Section 5 of the Act. Id. § 1973c. Under this requirement, the
Department of Justice may not allow changes in jurisdictions covered by the
Voting Rights Act if these changes "would lead to a retrogression in the position
of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
146. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1992), affd, 506 U.S.
801 (1992).
147. See id. at 394-95.
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Shaw v. Reno and its progeny. 148 At first blush, the facts pointed
clearly in the direction of partisan shenanigans, and the plaintiffs so
understood them, grounding their initial claim on the Court's
partisan gerrymandering doctrine. The lower court did not buy it,
and neither did the Supreme Court. 4 9 Undeterred, the plaintiffs
tried again, this time on a racial gerrymandering claim. Their
evidence consisted of maps, DOJ's insistence on a second majority
black district, and the fact that a black legislator had won the
contested seat.
On these facts, it takes some effort to conclude that the
redistricting plan must be subject to strict scrutiny review. To be
sure, racial factors played a role during the deliberations, as they
must in order for the state to comply with the Voting Rights Act. If
that is all it would take to subject any districting plan to the Court's
most exacting review, then it would make far more sense to stage a
frontal assault on the Act rather than encourage piecemeal
litigation. The Court held that the constitutional infirmity stemmed
from the use of race in the manner in which North Carolina used it,
as part of a plan "so irrational on its face that it can be understood
only as an effort to segregate voters into separate districts because
of their race.""
This type of harm came to be known as an "expressive harm.""'
Or, in the Court's oft-cited words:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one
another but the color of their skin . . . . reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group . . . think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls."'
While the Court conceded that this was a claim "analytically
distinct"'' from prior race cases, there was nothing new here, for, as
the Court stated, "[w]e have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes." 54
148. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see

TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, RACE

AND REDISTRICTING: THE SHAW-CROMARTIE CASES (2002).

149. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658.
151. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"BizarreDistricts,"and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-DistrictAppearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH L. REV. 483 (1993).

152. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
153. Id. at 652.
154. Id. at 647.
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This case has a clear explanation. The Court understood the
map in Shaw as an example of "uber-race consciousness,"1 as
flashing the message "RACE, RACE, RACE" in big, bold letters for
the entire world to see.
More perniciously, one may interpret it as
conveying a message of extreme race consciousness in the pursuit of
districting goals. As John Hart Ely eloquently put it, the message is
"'in your face,"' and may lead one to conclude: "Is there no length to
which they won't go to help black people?"'57 For the Court, the facts
in Shaw offer an "ostentatious display of race consciousness run
amok," instances of "in-your-face visual representations of racial
interest as raw political power."" 8 The Court sees race, the Court
does not like race, and so the Court applies strict scrutiny. How the
Court can get all this information from the map and the factual59
setting, of course, is in itself a difficult and troubling question. 1
Not surprisingly, the Court ultimately struck down the districting
plan. 60
None of this should be terribly surprising. As in Bush v. Gore,
we have come to expect this is the kind of aggressive posture from
the Court. Politics may be nasty, brutish, and short, unbounded in
either risks or complexities, yet the justices hardly worry as they
once did. Aggressive review is the order of the day, irrespective of
risk or complexity.
The Court's approach to political gerrymandering questions
stands in sharp contrast. The setting in these cases should be
familiar: a rogue legislature, hell-bent on enacting the partisan plan
of its choice, total partisan control of the redistricting process, and a
forgiving-perhaps non-existent--doctrinal canvas. The one absent
player in this setting is the Department of Justice, and that makes
all the difference in the world. Without an institutional push to
imbue race into the process, the outrage is restrained and altogether
different; the Court responds accordingly.
155. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial
Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 241 (2001).

156. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 610

(1993).
157. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50
STAN. L. REV. 607, 615 (1998) [hereinafter Ely, Gerrymanders].
158. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 155, at 240-41.
159.

See

MARK

MONMONIER,

BUSHMANDERS

AND

BULLWINKLES:

How

POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS

(2001); Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of
Photographs,Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARv.
L. REV. 1704 (1997).
160. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
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The doctrine in this area is replete with half-steps, missteps,
and even non-steps. The Court's struggle began soon after Baker,
when it refused to explicitly adjudicate these questions.16 1 Many
justices remained uncomfortable with the practice and sought to
regulate political gerrymandering questions through related, yet
indirect means. Karcher v. Daggett16' epitomized this approach, a
case where the Court applied the equipopulation standard with
unrelenting rigor in striking
down a blatant Democratic
163
gerrymander in New Jersey.

The Court ultimately relented to the force of its own reasoning
and concluded that political gerrymandering questions were
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.'
However, this
effort led to great disappointment. In the deeply fractured Davis v.
Bandemer165 case, the Court struggled to provide a standard to guide
the doctrine and instead offered a confused and ultimately
166
meaningless constitutional test. The recent Vieth v. Jubelirer
followed this hesitant and erratic script. According to the plurality
in Vieth, the Constitution lacks judicially manageable standards for
deciding these cases, while four justices offered various standards of
choice. 167 Justice Kennedy remained uncertain, yet unwilling for the
Court to abdicate the field just yet. 168 Finally, League of United
Latin

American

Citizens

v.

Perry-as blatant

a

political

gerrymander as we are likely to see-did not improve matters, as
Justice Kennedy decided the case on alternate grounds.169
This posture should strike us as odd and misconceived. Having
161. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (declining to decide the
constitutionality of a multi-member districting plan that operates "to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population").
162. 462 U.S. 725 (1983); see also Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949-50 (2004)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("After our recent decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004), the equal-population principle remains the only clear
limitation on improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to
dilute its strength.").
163. Clearly, this would not be enough. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard
H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law" Alone, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1999)
("But in [turning to the "individual rights-compelling state interest standard"],
the Warren Court locked into place conceptual tools that soon proved
insufficient for the next generation of cases.").
164. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
165. Id.
166. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
167. Id. at 368 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe mere fact that these four
dissenters come up with three different standards . . . goes a long way to
establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible standard.").
168. Id. at 311, 313-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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swept the question of power aside generations ago, it is too late in
the day to argue that standards are lacking or power unavailing.
The Court has power to do anything it wants, and myriad standards
exist, coming practically from all corners of the academy. More
troubling still, political gerrymandering claims are the one area of
the law of democracy where judicial intervention appears
normatively warranted. Where is there more need for judicial
supervision than in the very process whereby the people
in power
170
are also entrusted with the duty to draw district lines?
The facts seem uncomplicated: this is one area where the
political market appears to have failed, as the ins have choked off all
avenues of political change in order to remain in power. 171 If
electoral competition is the sine qua non of politics, then clearly our
political process
is one place where judicial intervention is decidedly
72
justified.
The
contrast
between
the racial
and the
political
gerrymandering cases is perverse for a number of reasons. In an
earlier case, Justice O'Connor warned that the Court's
reflexive application of precedent ignores the maxim that
'[p] articularly in dealing with claims under broad provisions of
the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive
process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that
generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete
situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of
context in disregard of variant controlling facts.'
"In cases such as this one," Justice O'Connor continued, "it is
not enough to cite precedent: we should examine it for possible
limits, and if they are lacking, for possible flaws." 74 This is a
remarkable assertion, particularly in light of Shaw, where the Court
deployed any and all available precedents in pursuit of its

170. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116

HARV.L. REV. 593 (2002).
171. See ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 23, at 103 (A political malfunction
deserving of judicial correction "occurs when the process is undeserving of trust,
when.., the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out."); Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election
Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat to Democracy?, NEW

Dec. 8, 2003, at 65 ("Voters no longer choose members of the House [of
Representatives]; the people who draw the [district] lines do." (quoting Samuel
Issacharoff)).
172. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30
NOVA L. REV. 253 (2006).
173. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145-46 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960)).
174. Davis, 478 U.S. at 146 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
YORKER,
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questionable conclusion, while distinguishing unhelpful cases.15
Shaw was as reflexive an application of precedent as we will ever
see, even while, paradoxically, the Court carved a new cause of
action out of this worn and misguided cloth. But Shaw involved
race, of course, not politics. And therein lies the difference.
The Justice O'Connor of the political
Ironies abound.
gerrymandering cases worries about inviting the losing side in every
reapportionment to fight its battles anew in the federal courts 76 and
about opening the doors of the federal courts to "pervasive and
unwarranted judicial superintendence of the legislative task of
apportionment"; 7 besides, the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment never intended to create a group right to
representational equality. 178 Yet curiously, these same worries do
not give the Court much pause in the racial gerrymandering context.
The use of race is condemned across the board, yet the imbuement of
politics is treated delicately, if at all. All the while, the justices'
personal discomfort with the map in question did most of the work.
Ely captured this point with characteristic wit: "this district has got
so somebody, anybody, must have standing to
to be unconstitutional,
179
raise the claim."

The justices display a similar approach across the law of
democracy. In Shaw, the Court deferred to no one, concerned that
these black districts "may balkanize us into competing racial
factions."8 ° Yet in Kiryas Joel, a case examining the creation of a
Jewish school district in New York City, Justice Scalia (in a
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice)
saw the district as part of the quintessential American "story of
groups of people sharing a common religious and cultural heritage
striking out to form their own communities."' One opinion derides
the use of race in politics, even while conceding its inevitability; yet
the other exalts the use of religion in crafting district lines, in clear
tension with the text and spirit of the First Amendment. 8 2 These
are curious positions to take simultaneously and difficult to

175. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (distinguishing United Jewish Org. of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
176. Davis, 478 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178.

See id.

179. John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111
HARv. L. REV. 576, 579-80 (1997).
180. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
181. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 735
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. See Shaw, 509 U.S. 630. But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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1 3

explain.
Similarly, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,' the Court
struck down patronage practices in employment on First
Amendment grounds. Justice Scalia dissented, as he concluded that
a constitutional ban on patronage "reflects a naive vision of politics
and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic effects of patronage
in promoting political stability and facilitating the social and
political integration of politically powerless groups.', 185
He
complained that this ban on patronage practices has weakened the
parties and has in turn led to the rise of interest groups. 86 Yet, in
California Democratic Party v. Jones,187 the Court struck down a
blanket primary system, a system under which "[a]ll persons
entitled to vote, including those not affiliated with any political
party, shall have the right to vote.., for any candidate regardless of
the candidate's political affiliation."'88 While Jones upholds the
worth of party autonomy, the patronage decisions take a contrary
view.
But the ironies hardly end there. For Justice Scalia, patronage
practices are a way to fulfill "the social and political integration of
excluded groups"; 8 9 their abolition, he complains, "prevents groups
that have only recently obtained political power, especially blacks,
from following this path to economic and social advancement.'8 °
Yet, and quite perversely, blacks better not attempt to put this
newfound power to use, in the form of social goods and preferential
policies, as the Court, including Justice Scalia, stands ready to
strike them down as examples of racial spoils and racial politics.' 9'

183. See Pamela S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause Cases Illuminate the Law of Democracy?, 83 IND. L.J.

1, 17 (2008).
184. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
185. Id. at 103-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For criticism of this view, and in
particular Justice Scalia's contention that patronage practices in fact helped
disadvantaged groups, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, "We Don't Want Anybody
Sent": The Death of Patronage Hiring in Chicago, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 57, 77
(1991) ("[Tlhe more a machine was able to consolidate its power by use of
patronage, the less likely it was to fulfill the function of broadening the number
of groups involved in the political process.").
186. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 107 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
188. Id. at 570.
189. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-37 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-94, 499, 505 (1989); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel
E. Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 133, 146-47, 162
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For Justice O'Connor, the state may not discriminate on political
grounds when awarding contracts to haul trash or tow cars; 192 but
similar discrimination in the crafting of districting lines does not
even raise a justiciable question.9 3 For the dissenting faction in
Shaw, the Court should stay out of this political minefield; yet the
Court must step in and cure the94political distortions created by
excessive political gerrymandering.
These arguments exemplify the justices' confused approach to
questions of politics.
The justices are driven by their issue
preferences, by their idiosyncratic views and assumptions about the
political world and the uses to which political power can be
legitimately put, and much less so by doctrine. This is true across
the board, from the gerrymandering and patronage cases to
campaign finance law.' 9' This is not a new insight. According to
Pam Karlan, for example, "[t]he Supreme Court as an institution
seems increasingly confused, or indifferent, about what politics is for
and when courts need to regulate the process. 196 Rick Pildes
similarly writes that "judicial application of constitutional law to
issues of democratic political organization has been tentative,
hesitant, erratic, and lacking in sustained commitment or
conviction."' 9' In other words, incoherence and disarray lay at the
heart of the field.
This is an arresting indictment of the Court and its regulation
of our political culture. As stated earlier, the field of democracy
presents the Court with myriad difficulties and complexities. The
Court must tread this terrain humbly and deferentially. Yet the
truth has been far from that. Baker v. Carr made sense as a
moment in the history of our politics when democratic outcomes
were "undeserving of trust."' 9 But that moment has long passed,
(2004).
192. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); O'Hare
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
193. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194. For example, compare Shaw, 509 U.S. at 661 (White, J., dissenting)
with Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344-46 (Souter, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission:
Ideology Trumps Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 350 (2004)
("Ideology, not a careful consideration of facts, theory, or the real-world effects
of legislation, appears to drive the majority to repeatedly fashion its opinion in
such categorical terms.").
196. Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995
Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289, 290 (1997).

197. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 319 (2000).
198. ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 23, at 103.
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and the better question for today is whether the Court can be
trusted any longer with the responsibility to regulate our political
process.
The Court of today has a much different agenda. Again, Rick
Pildes: "[w]here other judges have seen competitive practices that
ensure a robust and vital democratic system, the current Court has
seen threats to orderly democratic processes."' 99 The Court sees
chaos, in other words, which explains its willingness to step in and
set the political structures on their proper course. Such is the true
measure of a philosopher king.
VI.

BACK TO THE PROMISE OF BAKER

The Constitution recognizes numerous distinct spheres of
interaction, each governed by its own logic of norms that defines the
kinds of reasons for which government can appropriately act.
Constitutional adjudication . .

.

is primarily about defining the

normative structure of these different spheres.00
A philosopher king revels in determining when the use of race
predominates in a redistricting plan;' when burdens on the ballot
are severe and must be "narrowly tailored and advance a compelling
ls
state interest, ,,202 or less
severe and justified by "the State's
important regulatory interests";20 3 or when campaign finance laws
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. 20 ' These are
difficult inquiries, to be sure, inquiries that only a philosopher king
would dare undertake.
The Court regularly plays the part of philosopher king in
contemporary American law. Yet note the nature and complexity of
the enterprise, particularly in reference to the law of democracy.
What could corruption possibly mean in the context of campaign
199. Pildes, supra note 18, at 182.
200. Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712 (1994) [hereinafter
Pildes, Avoiding].
201. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
202. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997). As
an example of such an extreme burden, the Court has offered the following: "Of
course, what is demanded may not be so excessive or impractical as to be in
reality a mere device to always, or almost always, exclude parties with
significant support from the ballot." Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767,
783 (1974).
203. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
204. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976); see also Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-98
(1985); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99
(1981).
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finance?20 The Court provides little guidance on this score, treating
the term as an ipse dixit.2 °6 When are burdens on the ballot severe
or less so? The Court offers myriad admonitions about the case-by207
case nature of this inquiry, while conceding that the proof is in the
application. 28 And when exactly does race "predominate" during the
redistricting
process?0 9
The Court's answer is wholly
• .• 210
unsatisfying.
Make no mistake: the challenges posed by the law of democracy
are difficult and complex, and I do not wish to suggest otherwise.
However, as noted previously, the Court's performance as
democratic engineer is not worthy of much confidence. It is confused
and incoherent. Assertiveness in one area is closely followed by
passivity in another, and justifications for some actions are rejected
as insufficient in others.
This final Part argues that the Court should turn back to the
promise of Baker v. Carr, a promise grounded in rationality review
and the pursuit of legitimate state interests. Section V.A defends
my reading of rationality in redistricting. Section V.B makes sense
of the Court's shift from deferential review in Baker to aggressive
review in Reynolds. The shift from Baker to Reynolds is the central
moment in the history of judicial involvement in politics and
demands careful analysis. For it is Reynolds-not Baker-that lies
at the heart of the Court's modern posture. This Section criticizes
this move.

205. See generally Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in
CampaignFinance Law, 14 CONST.COMMENT. 127 (1997).
206. See Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court
and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 103 (1986) ("The phrase-

corruption and the appearance of corruption-has a ring that most Americans
will like. But its apparent clarity is deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded.
Worst of all, it is irrelevant to the issues of contemporary campaign finance.").
207. E.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("The rule is not selfexecuting and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made."); see
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 234 (1986) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Our cases make it clear that accommodation of these two vital
interests does not lend itself to bright-line rules but requires careful inquiry
into the extent to which the one or the other interest is inordinately impaired
under the facts of the particular case.").
208. See, e.g., Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 789 ("The results of this evaluation will
not be automatic."); Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 ("What the result of this process will
be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great assurance.").
209. See Ely, Gerrymanders,supra note 157, at 611-12.

210. Compare Easley v. Cromartie, 532 US 234, 243-44 (2001) (rejecting the
claim that race, not politics, explains the district lines), with Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 905-06 (1996) (holding race was the predominant factor in drawing of
district lines).
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The Promise:Deference, Rationality, and Exclusionary Reasons

In an important early work, Rick Pildes describes the
challenges faced by liberal republicanism in sustaining social and
political order in the face of fragmentation and disunity."' A
harmonious and consensual social order relied on a view of authority
as both vertical-from the top down-and horizontal-across
domains. 212 Values applied across all spheres. The erosion of this
unified social order demanded a response. And according to Pildes,
"[t]he most important element of this response was the adoption of
strategies of differentiation between different spheres of authoritythe drawing of boundaries to redefine the nature of authority and
21 No longer would values apply
carve it up into separate spheres.""
across spheres and domains; rather, the new order embraced
Its newfound insight was precisely here:
fragmentation.
justifications for action became context-specific, and what the
government could do in some areas would not be permitted in
others. At the heart of it all lay the concept of "excluded reasons"
and a reconsideration of our traditional understanding of individual
rights. 14 Again, Pildes: "rights are the tools the American legal
system has created for judicially policing the reasons excluded from
being legitimate justifications for state action in different
spheres."

15

On this view, rights are not trumps deployed against

governmental authority across the board, but the means by which
courts differentiate between spheres of authority. This model
alleviates the pressures inherent to balancing tests, yet creates
pressures of its own. Most pressingly for my purposes, one difficulty
stands above all others: how to define what constitutes a legitimate
reason in some areas but not others.
Pildes offers his own field of study-voting rights-as an
example of this approach to judicial decision-making.216 In Lassiter
v. Northampton County Board of Elections,217 the Supreme Court
upheld literacy tests as a legitimate exercise of state power, yet
seven years later, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,2 18
The cases appear
the Court struck down a state poll tax.
inconsistent on their face and are understood to reflect a change of
heart on the part of the Court. Yet the cases are easily reconcilable

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See Pildes, Avoiding, supra note 200.
See id. at 719.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 724.
See id. at 741-44.
360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).

HeinOnline -- 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1079 2008

1080

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

once we look to their particular context-voting-and the
justifications proffered in defense of the state actions. The question
is how far the state could go in defining its political community. As
the Court explained in Lassiter, the "ability to read and write
likewise has some relation to standards designed to promote
intelligent use of the ballot."21 9 In contrast, "[t]o introduce wealth or
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to
introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. 22 ° While a state could
choose to define its political community on grounds of literacy, it
could not do so on grounds of wealth.
This was Baker v. Carr. The Court in Baker only decided the
question of whether to play a role in redistricting at all. 22' The Court
did little else, as exemplified by its adoption of a rationality
standard, a standard that might be said to lead nowhere, "for most
apportionments can be deemed irrational only if the legislature is a
priori foreclosed from pursuing certain purposes, such as overrepresentation of some or of all rural areas. 222 The state of
Tennessee proved to be that extreme case, as the legislature failed
to redistrict for many years, thus rendering a finding of irrationality
quite easy.222 The Court did not demand equality of population nor
did it push for any other conception of democracy. Rather, the Court
inquired about the reasons for the districts in question. 224 That is,
the Court applied its rights rhetoric "to constrain the kind of reasons
that the government can act on when it seeks to regulate or
intervene in some sphere[s] of activity."225
The state could proffer no defense for its plan, the explicit
furtherance of no discernible interests. In this way, the Court in
Baker only prodded the political process into action and went no
further. To Alexander Bickel, the Court had simply "opened a
colloquy, posing to the political institutions of Tennessee the

219. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51.
220. Harper,383 U.S. at 668.
221. BICKEL, supra note 57, at 196 ("The point decided was not what
function the Court is to perform in legislative apportionment, and certainly not
whether it is to take over full management, but whether it can play any role at
all.").
222. Id.
223. Id. (explaining that the situation in Tennessee was the result "not of a
deliberate if imperfect present judgment of the political institutions, but merely
of inertia and oligarchic entrenchment").
224. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 31, at 1369-70.
225. Richard H. Pildes, Two Conceptions of Rights in Cases Involving
Political "Rights," 34 Hous. L. REv. 323, 325 (1997); see Richard H. Pildes,
Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law,

45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994).
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question of apportionment, not answering it for them., 22 6 As soon as
in some
the legislature passed a new statute, "curing the situation
end. 227
degree," the need for judicial intervention would
This is the proper posture for the law of democracy writ large.
The Court must approach questions in the field with a measure of
respect for the choices made by the political branches. Minimalism
is particularly important in this area, for the Court is ultimately
taking sides in politically charged controversies and elevating one
policy preference over another. We must give Justice Frankfurter
his due. This is true as an abstract proposition, yet more so in light
of the incoherence prevalent in the field. The Court must only
demand, as in Baker, a showing that the challenged statute pursues
This is a standard of heightened
legitimate state interests.
rationality, or "rationality with bite."228 This is the posture adopted
by the Supreme Court in Baker and by the lower court in the recent
Larios v. Cox,2 29 which the Court summarily affirmed. This is the
proper standard for the law of democracy.
B.

From Baker to Reynolds: On Manageability?

The conclusion that rationality review stands at the heart of the
field returns us to the puzzle discussed earlier: how to explain the
shift from rationality in Baker to the equipopulation principle in
Reynolds. Baker is commonly understood as reserving the question
of standards for another day. In this view, Baker casts the lower
courts adrift without much guidance. Reynolds v. Sims plays an
important and necessary role in this story, for it finally offers the
constitutional standard that Baker fails to provide.
This account is clearly wrong, or, at best, incomplete. I don't
think there is any question that Baker offered a standard for lower
226. See BICKEL, supra note 57, at 196-97; Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Some
Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REV. 829, 832 (1962) ("The Supreme
Court has not attempted to define what are the inequities of representation or
to prescribe remedies. It has issued merely a call for action."). Phil Neal
strongly disagrees with the Court's approach as interpreted by Katzenbach,
calling the preceding quote "the most devastating comment on Baker v. Carr."
Neal, supra note 88, at 327 n.211.
227. See BICKEL, supra note 57, at 196-97 ("Once a new apportionment
statute has been passed, curing the situation in some degree, there will be little
more that the judicial process can or should do.").
228. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12
(1972) (contending that the Burger Court was "prepared to use the [equal
protection] clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict
scrutiny language of the new equal protection" and labeling this approach
"equal protection bite without 'strict scrutiny'").
229. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
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courts to apply: heightened rationality and substantial equality.
The justices looked for an explanation for the challenged Tennessee
plan-any explanation-yet received none. Counsel for Tennessee
conceded that if an explanation existed for the lines as then crafted,
they did not know what it was. And so Baker demanded only a
justification for the lines under review. The Court was not weighing
justifications, nor was it terribly exacting in its review of the
challenged plan.
It only demanded a legitimate reason. And
according to the majority, counsel for the state could not provide
230
one.
Two years later, Reynolds provided an exacting standard for
reviewing districting plans-one person, one vote. But this need not
be understood to mean that Baker did not offer a standard of its
own. Instead, it is clear that the Court changed its mind and
decided to police the famed thicket far more aggressively than Baker
allows. This is the pivotal moment in the Court's historical handling
of political questions, for it is Reynolds that ultimately leads to Bush
v. Gore and the constitutionalization of American politics. Thus the
most important question in the law of democracy: what led to this
change?
An easy answer counts to five and the tenuous nature of the
Baker majority. 231 The case was argued once and set for reargument
while the votes of Justices Clark and Stewart hang in the balance.
Four Justices-Douglas, Brennan, Black, and Chief Justice
Warren-were fully prepared to interject the Court into the
redistricting arena.
Two Justices-Frankfurter and Harlanwished for the Court to side with Colegrove's prudential approach.
Justice Whittaker was prepared to side with Justice Brennan and
the Chief Justice, but was not willing to cast the fifth vote. This
leaves two justices in the middle-Stewart and Clark. One reading
of Baker looks to these justices in the middle and explains the
Court's apparent diffidence as a way to either attract Stewart and/or
Clark to the majority, or keep them there.232

230. See Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating, supra note 119, at 431-32.
231. A related answer argues that the Court had tapped a latent consensus
among the public, which helped explain Baker's overwhelming reception. See
McCloskey, supra note 87. Rick Hasen also looks to the notion of social
consensus, yet concedes that barely any social consensus had evolved by 1964, a
scant two years after Baker. See HASEN, supra note 33, at 81.
232. See Mikva, supra note 94, at 658 ("In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan
refused to go beyond the jurisdiction question because he brought Justice
Stewart along to the majority with that limitation. And even after Justice
Clark surprisingly joined in the decision, Justice Brennan stayed to the narrow
result and ended up with six votes rather than five."); Neal, supra note 88, at
267.
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More counting does not get us any closer to a conclusive answer.
Among the Justices, Justices Clark, Harlan, Frankfurter, and
Stewart do not interpret the equal protection clause as requiring
population equality. In turn, Justice Douglas appears to be in the
equipopulation camp but would allow some room for weighting.23
Justice Black also appears to be in this camp,234 while the Chief
Justice and Justice Brennan are silent on this issue.235 By the time
Reynolds is decided, Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker have left
the Court, replaced by Justices Goldberg and White. This new
composition leads the Court to Reynolds. But what exactly does
Reynolds lead to?
It is conventional wisdom that Reynolds offers a strong and
assertive application of "one person, one vote."236 This is a story
where the Court asserts itself in the face of chaos and uncertainty.
The Baker approach is uncertain, perhaps even devoid of
manageability, and places great trust and discretion in the hands of
the lower courts. Reynolds responds to this reality and in so doing
demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to trust the judicial process.
Case-by-case adjudication appears to be a thing of the past.
The Court's own words get in the way of this story, however.
Reynolds speaks the language of "substantial equality" 237 and refers
to the use of population only as "the starting point,"238 while lending
assurances that "mathematical nicety is not a constitutional
requisite."239 On its face, then, Reynolds does not lead to a hardened
and unforgiving equipopulation principle. The Court is very clear on
this point: "[flor the present, we deem it expedient not to attempt to
The Court even
spell out any precise constitutional tests."240
embraces case-by-case adjudication.
A better answer connects Baker to Reynolds through the prism
of exclusionary reasons. In Baker, the Court implies that population
equality is the "starting point" for evaluating districting plans.242
Hence the prominent use of various population charts in the

233. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244-45 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("Universal equality is not the test; there is room for weighting.").
234. See, for example, his dissenting opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting).
235. For a discussion of these positions, see Lucas, supra note 57, at 773
n.247.
236. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
237. Id. at 568.
238. Id. at 567.
239. Id. at 569.
240. Id. at 578.
241. Id.
242. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
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litigation and during deliberations. The Court in Reynolds makes
this point explicitly. But the Court goes much farther than that,
using language that should strike readers as curious and misplaced.
For example, the Court explains that "[d]iluting the weight of votes
because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious
discriminations based upon factors such as race . . . or economic

status.243
If the analogy holds, equating residential dilution with race
discrimination should lead to strict scrutiny. Instead, the Court
takes a decidedly different path: "[t]he fact that an individual lives
here or there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting
the efficacy of his vote."2" Similarly, "[a] state may legitimately
desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions,"245
but "history alone," or "economic or other sorts of group interests,
are [not] permissible factors in attempting to justify" population
divergences. 246

"Considerations of area alone" also fall short as

justifications.247 The punch line could not be any clearer: a state
may diverge from strict population equality "[slo long as the
divergences . . .are based on legitimate 2considerations
incident to
4
policy."
state
rational
a
of
effectuation
the

Reynolds essentially promises to be a more explicit remake of
the Baker opinion, if the Court's language can be believed. But the
aftermath of the reapportionment revolution gets in the way of this
story. Unwilling to regulate the law of democracy at the margins,
the Court soon expanded the scope of its intervention into the world
of politics. The domestication of the political-question doctrine led
to the internalization of any and all questions of politics as part and
parcel of traditional judicial review. Reynolds is an important
aspect of this story because it demonstrates how easily and
simplistically the Court could come to dominate a difficult area.
Once the Court could implement a standard such as "one person,
one vote," there was little the Court could not do. This was
Hercules, on steroids.249
Even within the population morass begun by Reynolds, the
Court took its teachings to an extreme, yet questionable, resting

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 580.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).

249.

The reference is to RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105

(1977).
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place.
In so doing, it brings to mind Professor Henkin's prescient
comment: "Judgment consists in drawing lines, not in staying put,
nor in following blindly where the inertia of motion leads. But a
doctrinal line must have a reason: that a line has to be drawn
somewhere does not mean that it may be drawn anywhere."25 ' In
due course, the Court settled on a two-tiered equipopulation track.252
For congressional plans, the Court applies the "one person, one vote"
principle with a vengeance. Under Article I, Section 2, the Court
concludes that any deviation from equality must be "unavoidable
despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality,, 253 or else it
must be justified. In turn, state plans are subject to far more
For plans
flexible scrutiny under equal protection principles.
enacted by state legislative bodies, the Court devises an "under
10%" de minimis line, an apparent safe haven that affords the plan
in question a prima facie grant of constitutionality.
Larger
deviations must be justified by the reasonable pursuit of a rational
state policy. 255

Yet court-ordered

plans are subject to stricter

standards. Deviations from population equality are not protected by
the ten-percent standard.2 6 Rather, they must be "little more than
de minimis" and must be rationally supported by important and
257
significant state interests.

250. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail
of "One Man-One Vote," 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 219, 227 ("After an auspicious

beginning in Baker v. Carr, the Court has proceeded logically and inexorably
from a defective major premise to a questionable conclusion concerning the
population role in districting and apportionment.").
251. Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 63
(1968).
252. While this distinction has been criticized for its artificiality, (see, for
example, Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial
Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643 (1993)), some have argued

that the Court may play a better role in regulating congressional elections than
state elections.

See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Inequities in Districting for

Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962).
253. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); see Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 729 (1983); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546
(1969).
254. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). But see Larios v. Cox,
300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), affd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (affirming
lower court opinion that strikes down state plan within ten percent safe haven).
255. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
256. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26 (1975) ("A court-ordered plan...
must be held to higher standards than a State's own plan."); Connor v. Finch,
431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977) ("We have made clear [in Chapman) that.., a court
will be held to stricter standards in accomplishing its task than will a state
legislature.").
257. Chapman, 420 U.S. at 27.
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The Court must get its due: a legislature could not have done it
any better. This is a manageable and administrable mess, to be
sure, but the much harder question, as Professor Ely dryly
remarked, is "what else it has to recommend it."25 This is an
important point for those who exhort the Court's aggressive posture
within the law of democracy, as they must contend with evidence of
ad hoc theorizing and arbitrary line-drawing. Rather than postulate
our theories of choice, we must first reconsider the Court's
involvement in the law of democracy.
CONCLUSION

Indeed, the recent Supreme Court dissents make me feel as if
I've entered Mondo Bizarro when the Justices defend against a
charge of racialgerrymandering by responding that it was actually
politics ....

259

Four decades have elapsed since the Court entered the political
thicket in Baker v. Carr. And unfortunately, the evidence of the
Court's success in this arena is decidedly mixed. The early days of
the reapportionment revolution brought about needed change within
the stagnant legislative processes across the nation. But as the
Court gained confidence in its handling of political questions, its
posture became increasingly aggressive.
This is a selective
aggressiveness, inconsistent across the field.
We could go on making the arguments we do and behaving as if
it all makes sense. Unfortunately, the Court has made clear that it
cannot be trusted in its self-appointed role as regulator of our
politics. For my part, I would rather see the Court pay heed to the
lessons of Baker. The law of democracy, and American democracy as
a whole, would be better served with a Court far more humble and
deferential to policy decisions made elsewhere.
This was the
promise of Baker v. Carr.
Over the course of four decades, the Court has had its chance to
regulate the field of democracy. The evidence is in, and not very
flattering: the doctrine is confused, incoherent, and driven by
judicial attitudes and the justices' notions of good public policy. The
Court assertively makes its way through the famed thicket while
guided not by established doctrine, but by the infamous "judicial
hunch." Professor Karlan makes this point characteristically well:
"[hiaving embarked on the course of resolving political questions
into judicial ones, it is notable how many of these judicial questions
the Court fails to resolve, or to resolve in a doctrinally coherent and
258. ELY, DISTRUST,supranote 23, at 121.
259. Ely, Gerrymanders, supranote 157, at 620.
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stable way."26 ° In this vein, Bush v. Gore is not altogether
mysterious, or appalling, or even shocking; rather, it is the
traditional way the Court has come to navigate the field.
In the meantime, scholars continue to press for their preferred
theories for reviewing the law of democracy. This is another way of
saying that the scholarly community has embraced the role of the
Court as philosopher king. But the Court has proven unequal to the
task. It is time for the Court to go back to its roots and the promise
of Baker v. Carr.

260.

Karlan, supra note 196, at 292.
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